Well, that wasn’t great. I think a lot has already been covered in the discussion here so I’m not going to rehash what I believe are the clear factors in deciding the result – losing the aerial contest and territorial game – but I did want to take a look at what’s hampering the backline. In order to do this, I focused on the ABs’ set piece attack in Buenos Aires. Why set piece attack (SPA)? One of the easiest ways to both control the flow of the game and get your backline involved is through prepared strikes from either lineout or scrum. A lot of it can be brought back to analysis and preparation: where is the opposition weak, how do they typically defend, where is the space available that can be exploited, etc.? In the second Test against Argentina, the ABs had 13 set piece platforms inside the Argentina half (11 lineouts, 2 scrums), with 6 taking place between the halfway line and opposition 22, and 7 inside or around the ARG 22. The difference in positive outcomes between the two zones is stark, as the following table attempts to show. Set piece attack in ARG II: a lack of efficiency between the 22 and 50 metre lines, as well as an inability to string together momentum in the 2nd half From the 6 opportunities to launch a set piece attack between the halfway line and the opposition 22, just one led to a positive outcome: the final play of the game where Argentina infringed at the breakdown in the 80th minute, the game already having been won by the Pumas. All other opportunities led to negative outcomes, whether it was a handling error, a loss of gain line or the set piece itself breaking down. Contrast this to the AB set piece attack inside or just outside the ARG 22: of the 7 opportunities, 6 led to positive outcomes, with either a try being scored or momentum being sustained, through winning either a penalty advantage or gain line. Red zone efficiency One consistent aspect which the coaches have clearly worked on is efficiency inside the opposition 22. From only 5 entries inside the opposition 22, the ABs averaged a scoring rate of 3.4 points scored per entry. The basis of this scoring efficiency is, I believe, (1) the use of creative set-ups from lineout attack and (2) improved decision-making on the edge. On the first facet, the ABs would consistently employ a 6-man lineout throughout the game, with the +1 (Savea) typically being used in a myriad of ways (front-option decoy, lifter, hidden run option) to manipulate opposition defence. A good example of this creative thinking in the lineout occurs in the 23rd minute. Joining the line as a front-option decoy, Savea places himself in a hidden position after Holland’s lineout take, in order to be able to make an arcing run-up to the line. Here, the 5+1 set-up is used to integrate Savea’s running game, positioning himself as a front-option decoy from which he can attack the seam at the back of the lineout While this lineout strike didn’t lead to a try, it shows the ability of the AB red zone attack to consistently put the Argentina defence on the back foot (see also Taylor’s blindside run for the first try), getting on top of the opposition defence before they can properly organize. The second aspect is improved decision-making on the edge. In 2024, the ABs tended to go for single-phase lineout strikes, using complex backline moves which were meant to bypass the defence in first phase. This often led to players being swarmed by the scramble defence out wide, after which the AB attack would consistently be on the backfoot against an aggressive defence with line speed. Reece (2024 Cape Town Test) attempting to go for the corner after the lineout arrow attack, yet being swallowed up by the Bok scramble In 2025, the ABs seemed to have moved away from the first phase-patterns, instead looking to shift the point of attack in order to disrupt the opposition defence first before going wide. Newell’s try is a good example of this, Savea acting as a distributor which effectively draws the defence away from the point of contact. The ABs again show some nice attacking innovation, with short passes – from Reece to Proctor (not in the gif), Savea to Parker and Savea to Newell The first try to Proctor is another: similar to Reece in Cape Town, Ioane is put into space out wide, with the Argentina scramble racing straight towards him. Ioane has to wait for the pass so if he tries to make the corner, he most likely gets scragged into touch by the Argentina scramble D Unlike Reece, however, Ioane immediately steps off his left foot, cutting back against the grain and looking to draw as many of those four defenders onto him as possible. With so many defenders now off their feet and space everywhere around the ruck, Christie is easily able to draw the last defender and pass to Proctor, who falls over the try line practically untouched. It shows, at least, that there’s been improvement in certain areas, with clear weaknesses of last year being identified and solutions being found for overcoming them. But another weakness of last year – backline strikes between the 22 and halfway line – remains worryingly clunky, with few signs of improvement. A malfunctioning backline I have mentioned above that set piece attack is not just a way to control the game’s momentum but also to get your backline involved. In the second Test against the Pumas, on 5 occasions (out of a total 13 SPA) the ball was moved into the backline within 3 phases, with just two of those leading to positive outcomes. Between the halfway line and the opposition 22, the backline was given the ball on just three occasions from set piece, just the one being (sort of) successful. So what exactly seems to be going wrong here? I’d argue that there are three factors: coaching, player skillsets and team identity. I’ll try to further clarify these factors by comparing the ABs’ SPA from ARG II to a 2025 Six Nations game between France and Scotland at the Stade de France. These two teams were the most effective in constructing 22 entries so they present an interesting comparative framework for what the ABs aren’t currently getting right in their approach. (1) Coaching A good example of some of the things going wrong in the AB backline can be found by taking a closer look at the lineout attack at around the 17th minute. The ABs have the throw in – again, going for a 5+1 set-up – and briefly form a maul before Ratima passes the ball into midfield. From there, you have Jordie running the crash line with Parker in support, Beauden and Reece looping round, Proctor running an unders line and Jordan out the back, with Ioane keeping width. This is how it plays out. The idea is relatively straightforward, I believe: get Jordan into a one-on-one situation out wide where he can use his game-breaking ability to either create a line break for himself or others. What ends up happening, however, is Jordan being tackled more than 10 metres behind the gain line, with the ABs lucky not to concede the turnover. A comparison to a Scotland lineout, also around the halfway line, shows where things went wrong. A first thing to note is that Scotland use a 4 man-lineout instead of a 6 man. The immediate benefit of this is that the backline is much more robust, with players filling the field, allowing for multiple attack shapes and realignments. The four man-lineout allows for both sides of the field to fill up with options and support, allowing a team to attack either through switch plays This set-up gives the Scotland attack multiple options: they can either (a) try to engineer a line break on the openside or (b) they can swing their backs back round to the blind after the ruck’s been built in order to attack trailing French forwards. They go for option (b) and make a sizable territorial gain while being on the front foot. Compare this set-up with the one the ABs ran against the Pumas and it quickly becomes apparent how Jordan has very little support around him when he eventually receives the ball. Jordan is completely isolated when receiving the ball, with two Argentinean defenders – Cinti and Chocobares – fully focused on him. If the ABs want to run a set up like this, the play here calls for a territorial kick from Jordan, after which the backline can put pressure on the ARG backfield. But looking at the play, it never appears as if this was the plan. This strikes me, first and foremost, as a coaching failure, the attack being improperly set up from lineout attack, with fairly predictable results. The backline here is stretched way too thin, way too quickly, with an improper estimation by the coaches of the risk/reward-balance. (2) Player skillsets Staying with the same example, it becomes further apparent how flawed skill execution makes an already difficult strike move near-impossible. First, Jordie passes too quickly out the back, failing to draw any defenders onto him while also not being able to impede any defenders from drifting to the open. And secondly, Beauden Barrett’s pass is too high and hits behind Jordan’s inside shoulder, which means the latter has to stop to catch the ball rather than accelerate onto it. With execution like this, the strike is basically already over before it has begun. We can again compare this to Scotland’s skill execution on set piece attack, this time from a scrum around halfway. Tom Jordan passes out the back at the last instance, holding his defender while basically running into the French defensive line without the ball, which opens up the space for Russell to run into for the line break. Jordie already showed in this game that he has the skillset to execute this timing (see his ball out the back for the first try) but he needs to be able to consistently execute this skill for the backline to properly come to life. (3) Team identity It does appear as if this All Black team is at a crossroads, with their traditional strength (backline play) not clicking while their current strength (scrum and maul) not fully being given the keys to the castle. The even distribution between forwards and backs from SPA between the 50 and 22 – each receiving 3 possessions out of 6 – a reflection perhaps of this conflicted identity. And there is certainly a case to be made for clarity. Looking at the game between France and Scotland, each team was clear in how and where they wanted to play. Whereas France kept it amongst their forwards to maul the ball up-field, Scotland wanted to make use of their backline, with 9 out of their 11 set piece attacks moving into midfield. And while neither side were perfect in their execution, for both sides their positive outcomes outweighed the negatives. If the ABs want to improve their outcomes from set piece attack between the halfway line and the opposition 22, they might do well to decide what kind of team they want to be, whether they want to maul everything or whether they want to throw it around amongst the backs. What can be said with some certainty is that the current strategy – to balance the two – doesn’t seem to be working. Tl:dr The coaching staff have improved some areas (22 efficiency) while failing to improve others (SPA between halfway and opp. 22). This failure has also impacted the ability of the backline to click, while significantly contributing themselves to this inability as well. The main factors impacting this failure to improve seem to me to be coaching, player skillsets and team identity. While it shouldn’t all be doom and gloom, the sheer number of areas which still need improvement, would indicate that this side is still some time away from putting it all together.

Finally got to finish a replay. From what i read/heard i was expecting far worse. I thought the first half was pretty bloody good, and the last quarter to take back momentum even better. I saw some real intent with linespeed, albeit disjointed at times which might come back to bite us. The 6 lowest numbers on the team sheet were fucking excellent. Good set piece, robust around the track. They are setting a great platform that, even if it was a bit messy, we took advantage of. That was a lot of points in the first half of an away game. Everything went completely to shit after half time and 12 months ago we probably lose that, but Sami and Patty T add so much off the bench, and the smart decision was made to ignore the big numbers and play tight. Crushed the last of the life out of them. Happy to see the skipper justify the faith in him with a big first half. Newell played maybe his best test? How did Vaai suddenly become our most mobile and busiest loose forward? Out the back Will Jordan is a weapon. A few brickbats if i may. The 7 and 8 selected is not working. Kirifi puts himself about but he isn't good enough to really impact the game on either side of the ball or at the breakdown. This was not a good Savea test. Do you even have shoulders fluffybunny? One try was him trying to scrag rather than putting in a shoulder. I saw one at fucking pillar where he did the same thing on a P&G and he let the guy make metres. THe less said about that enormous hole he left in midfield the better. Yeah he pumps his legs well hard and it looks cool, but you're playing #8, get harder. I need someone, anyone, to tell me why BB is an automatic selection at 10. How many absolutely shit house kicks did he put in, often under no fucking pressure whatsoever? The backline is completely dysfunctional, so it's not that either. DMac is not prefect, but at least his passing game puts guys in holes, or gives them opportunities to get outside blokes. The complete mess outside of him i am willing to forgive because he is serving up shit week after week. 11, 13 and 14 are redundant with what ever we are doing at the moment. I get Christy being on the bench because we are out of halfbacks, but, even as one of his biggest fans, ALB has surely done his dash. A good win that we made much harder on ourselves than it should have been because a few favoured sons are letting the side down.

A good Test to watch. Can’t say I’ve read everything in the thread but Proctor seemed to pop up quite a few times when skimming through so thought it would it be interesting to focus my rewatch on his game. So why Billy Proctor? While I think Proctor has an underrated attacking game (SRP: 43% tackle evasion, which makes him one slippery customer), it seems to me that his selection at outside centre is mostly based around his defence. And yes, I understand that’s a strange point to make when his most notable moment in the past 4 Tests was his miss on Attissogbé in the first French game in Dunedin. But what I mean is that I believe the selectors value his defensive style of play. One very noticeable aspect of this AB season is that the team is increasingly successful in its implementation of defensive line speed. They already tried to introduce more defensive pressure in 2024, but this was often met with very mixed results (see the Wellington Argentina Test, for example). While the defence is by no means perfect, at least the players are showing an increased understanding of their roles and responsibilities on the field. One of these principles is that the ABs work with a split midfield in defensive multiphase. After defending the first phase of a set piece strike together, the midfielders would each move to one side of the field. There, they have the task of organizing and bringing defensive line speed, each midfielder connecting with their outside winger in order to shut down backdoor plays or sweeping moves. It is in this regard that someone like Proctor becomes valuable. Proctor excels in reading backdoor plays and is consistently able to shut these plays down, catching opponents on the backfoot and creating potential turnovers. In Super Rugby Pacific, he had one of the highest rates of dominant tackles across the competition (14.9%), reflecting his proficiency in catching ball carriers behind the gain line. Against Argentina In the weekend’s Test match against Argentina, Proctor gave plenty of examples why he is selected to perform this task. Argentina have an excellent attacking shape, using similar diamond pods and first five looping plays made famous at Leinster, courtesy of Contepomi’s Dublin connection. Early in the match, Proctor had a chance to show his abilities, after Jordie Barrett kicked long from his own 22, leading to an Argentina attack from kick return. With Argentina setting up a midfield ruck and with plenty of numbers to the openside, Proctor has as his job to bring line speed in order to either deter the wide attack or reach man and ball at the same time, if they do decide to go there. In the next phase, Albornoz goes flat to Oviedo who is immediately wrapped up by Proctor, driven back in the tackle and subsequently driven off the ball, after the AB 13 quickly got back to his feet to initiate the counter-ruck alongside Rieko Ioane. This is why the Hurricanes centre is in the AB midfield: organize the defence, initiate line speed, connect with the outside backs and pressure the opposition recycle behind the gain line. The ABs win the penalty and march deep inside the Argentina 22. Twenty minutes later, Proctor and Ioane would repeat their double act, this time reading the play well from an Argentina scrum attack, Chocobares throwing the backdoor to Albornoz who quickly tried to transfer Delguy. First, Proctor is nearly able to grab man and ball again but Ioane is on hand to finish the defensive stop comprehensively. The ABs are unlucky that Ioane is pinged for a tackle without the ball – despite Delguy first having the ball, making him a legitimate target – otherwise it would’ve been another defensive win. So why not Billy Proctor? So far, so good, I’d say. Proctor is a centre who works well in Tamati Ellison’s defensive system, with the potential to eventually come alive on attack as well. Then again, there are a few reasons to be critical of Proctor, some of them systems-related, others from a purely individual perspective. Looking back at the split midfield defensive set-up, it’s clear it works well in shutting down outside threats (if your midfielders are able to read the play well, that is). But like any system, it often just means that you’re relocating your vulnerabilities. In this case, the seam between each midfielder and their inside forwards is often ripe for the picking. For an example, we can turn to the 49th minute. Argentina has a lineout attack inside the AB half. After first defending together for the initial move, Jordie and Proctor quickly split, Barrett moving to the right hand side, with Proctor on the left. With Barrett now moving to the right wing in order to organize line speed there, it leaves Ardie defending in the midfield, inside Proctor. With Argentina mostly shut out in the first half, they’ve clearly discussed other possibilities during halftime, the space such as that between Savea and Proctor here a likely topic of discussion Using this system asks a lot of forwards like Savea who suddenly has a critical role in midfield defence. It becomes apparent pretty quickly that this responsibility – shooting up to close the space and quickly retreating to get back onside – isn’t a particular strong suit of the number 8, first being slow to connect in the advance, then being behind in getting back onside. Watch Ardie in the midfield, creating a fracture in the defensive line In the very next phase, Albornoz would easily exploit this disconnect, floating a ball between Savea and Proctor for Oviedo to run hard onto, splitting them open for the important line break. While it’s hard to lay the blame at someone’s feet without hearing what’s being said on the field, you’d think this is most likely a comms issue. Here, Proctor’s inexperience likely works against him. Still, he needs to coach Savea to be aware of the different threats and connect properly with his insides and outsides. A second critical note can be boiled down to purely athletic factors. While Proctor clearly has a good head on his shoulders, his execution can at times be found wanting. For example, in the 12th minute, Proctor again correctly reads the Argentina attacking play but allows Cinti to step out of the tackle. While it doesn’t lead to a particularly bad territory loss, these kinds of tackles need to be made, since there won’t always be a proper defensive scramble available. It’s something that Jordie Barrett unfortunately had to find out the hard way for the Albornoz try early in the 2nd half. And while I like the fact that Robertson seems more inclined to select glue players in glue positions, in recent years the All Blacks have escaped with wins they shouldn’t have, simply because they had more talented players across the park than the other team (I like to call it the ‘Beauden Barrett special’). With Proctor, you lose that particular gambit. Provide him with terrible ball, he will just get turned over. A player like Leicester Fainga’anuku won’t provide you with the same defensive reads as Proctor (76.6% tackle completion at Toulon, with only 5.6% of those dominant) but in these kinds of situations, it wouldn’t surprise you to see the former make something out of nothing, whether through an offload or by simply bulldozing through contact. So far at least, the coaches seem quite firm in the decision they’ve made for the kind of player they want at 13. Summary So far, Billy Proctor seems to be mostly doing what I believe he’s being selected for: he’s organizing and bringing line speed from outside in, he’s connecting well with his outsides (whether it’s Ioane or Reece) and he’s tackling at a high rate of dominance (18% across his 3 Tests in 2025, which is comparable to England’s Henry Slade during the 2025 Six Nations). The line speed defence is also running increasingly smoothly but as all systems are apt to, is showing frailties in other areas. So is Proctor showing enough at 13? Lienert-Brown did well in the third Test against France (20% tackle dominance and a well-taken try) but his continuous ill-discipline (4 penalties and a yellow card in less than 80 minutes played total) makes him a hard case to argue for. Fainga’anuku, with his utility value as being able to play midfield, wing and loose forward, seems like an ideal bench player while others, like AJ Lam, might find it difficult to gain selection, with an already congested squad. Proctor’s objectives, on the other hand, seem relatively clearcut: make sure to finish your defensive reads and start finding ways to contribute more on attack, for example, by working harder to stay alive in contact . But if his development at Super Rugby is any indication, then there’s reason to think that it should only be a matter of time.

Watching the NPC, it quickly becomes apparent that the playing styles of the Super Rugby teams and their linked NPC unions within their so-called “feeder areas” (not my term: ) don’t always look particularly aligned. This perhaps shouldn’t come as a surprise with the recent reports on the many tensions between the Super Rugby franchises and the provincial unions, with NZR seemingly hellbent on gradually pushing the NPC out of its development pyramid: And yet, it is interesting how those tensions are becoming increasingly visible on the field as well, with some NPC teams going in clearly different strategic directions than their Super Rugby parent clubs. Contrasting playing philosophies The best example of this contrast between NPC and SR in 2025 is probably the game plan of Auckland, which revolves around playing with width and moving the ball on attack, looking to make use of their speedy backs out wide. This is pretty much diametrically opposed to how the Blues played in both 2024 and 2025 under the coaching of Vern Cotter: of all the SR teams, they ranked last in both playing the ball wider than 1st (14.6%; comp. avg.: 23.6%) and 2nd (5.0%; comp. avg.: 8.9%) receiver, as well as being the bottom team for total average pass attempts (135 per game; comp. avg.: 162.2 per game). In their game against Canterbury, Auckland have already surpassed the Blues’ highest passing game of 2025 (186 passes against the Crusaders in Round 6), throwing 206 passes in the 19-15 loss. Taylah Johnson’s remark after Vai’s second try, which came after some silky but risky transfers out wide by both Taele and Simpson – “This is the kind of Auckland rugby phase play that we like to see” – perhaps more telling than she intended, if viewed from the stylistic and institutional tensions between the Blues and their biggest provincial union. Is this also the kind of Auckland rugby phase play that Vern Cotter likes to see? I’m not too sure Selection issues The misalignment between Super Rugby and NPC teams isn’t just limited to playing philosophies but to those around selection as well. The Highlanders, for example, have struggled in deciding the makeup of their loose forward trio, with players shifting around throughout the 2025 season. There were only three loose forward combinations which made more than one appearance: the Withy (6) – Lasaqa (7) – Broughton (8) combo (2 apps.), the Howden (6) – Withy (7) – Stodart (8) combo (2 apps.) and the Howden (6) – Lasaqa (7) – Withy (8) combo (5 apps.). The latter combo seemed to be firmly favoured near the end of the season, which coincided with a series of good performances against the Hurricanes (Rd. 14) and Crusaders (Rd. 15) especially. Whether the combination will eventually flourish in Super Rugby will mostly depend on whether Sean Withy can find his feet at the back of the scrum. A classical, rugged flanker, Withy didn’t always look comfortable with the typical demands of the 8-position, but showed increasing signs of attacking involvements in the final games. If the Highlanders were to persist with this combination for the 2026 season, an NPC season at number 8 for Withy would accelerate his familiarity with the role. And yet, the misalignment between SR and NPC quickly rears its head here, once again: the Southland Stags have a much more classical number 8 on their books – Semisi Tupou Ta’eiloa – which means that Withy’s momentum and development at the back of the scrum is, once again, halted until the new Highlanders season. And by the time this season comes around, he might already be surpassed by players who do rack up experience at number 8 in the NPC, like Nikora Broughton and Hugh Renton. Many other players are in the same boat: Dalton Papali’i plays at blindside for Counties Manukau and Anton Segner at openside for Auckland, yet they reverse their jersey-numbers when they’re at the Blues; Xavi Taele has played exclusively at 12 for the Blues up to this point but lines up at 13 for Auckland; Kaylum Boshier is one of Taranaki’s finest players at number 8 yet was only used (as a starter) at openside for the Chiefs; Siale Lauaki, one of the most promising props in the country, is being redeveloped into a loosehead prop by the Hurricanes (he even played loosehead in club rugby for Norths), yet the Wellington Lions continue to use him exclusively as a tighthead. There are plenty more examples like these. At a certain point, it looks like the unions and SR teams aren’t just not aligned but are at times actively working against each other, each side seemingly entrenched in their way of viewing things with little appetite for a shared strategic plan. Some signs of (intentional and unintentional) alignment Then again, there are also signs that not all unions are completely at odds with their associated SR teams. Last season, Otago had the 2nd most dominant tackles in the competition with 126, with only Wellington making more. This season, Otago are once again in the top echelon of dominant tacklers and are joined, furthermore, by the Southland Stags. It looks to be part of a broader Highlanders strategy for becoming a defensive powerhouse. Last year, the Landers already led Super Rugby Pacific in dominant tackles per game (12.9, Opta) and with the appointment of David Kidwell as defence coach, the region seems to be trying to cement being a dominant defensive side as a central rugby identity. And while I can’t say this with any certainty, it does look as if a shared framework between Highlanders, Otago and Southland represents an important part of this burgeoning identity. There are other examples of alignment, but of a more unintentional kind. While the Hurricanes and their provincial unions seem to have their differences in terms of player positioning and selection, as far as playing style is concerned there seems to be a considerable harmony across the different teams. But this harmony seems less rooted in any sort of preconceived strategy than in the historical rugby culture and identity of the region, which is based around attacking rugby, beating your defender and keeping the ball alive. The Hurricanes in 2025 were a side who liked to use the width of the field to attack, with only the Drua going to the openside more than the Canes. They were competition leaders in offloads and in defenders beaten as well, averaging 9.5 offloads while beating nearly 30 defenders per game for a tackle evasion percentage of 22% (Opta). Attacking stats per 80min for the 2025 Hurricanes The Hurricanes provinces – Hawke’s Bay, Manawatū, Wellington – have shown a remarkable consistency in style of play across the first two rounds of the NPC, with both Wellington and Hawke’s Bay offloading more than any other teams in the comp, while only Waikato have beaten more defenders than Wellington (60). Attacking stats per 80min for the 3 Hurricanes’ provinces The averages across the provincial unions within the Hurricanes’ franchise area indicate that, even if there are tensions between the SR team and the NPC teams, there does seem to be a shared culture which transcends the immediate tensions between the teams. It is a further symbol of the fact that, while there’s a degree of artificiality surrounding the Super Rugby teams, most of them do contain thorough cultural traces of their respective areas. But it will only benefit all parties if these historical traces are further cultivated and grown through actual, everyday collaboration. It’s clear that there are still many shoots of potential further professional growth in New Zealand’s rugby landscape but perhaps not that much desire nor diplomatic nous to actually make it happen. Summary The Men’s Pathways and Competitions (MPAC) report made clear that there’s a need and future for the NPC within the NZ Rugby structure. Still, the first signs on the field indicate that any sort of collaborative and shared rugby strategy is still largely lacking for most teams, the provincial unions seemingly left with a lot of autonomy in terms of playing strategy and player selection. And while there’s certainly a case to be made for the developmental benefit of different rugby environments and cultures, the structure has the unintentional downside of making it more difficult for those players who need consistent playing time in one position for their rugby development. Getting to grips with the nuances of a certain attacking system or the requirements of a new position can become exponentially harder when that player has to switch between environments as well as positions in the middle of his season. A more thorough collaboration between SR teams and their respective provincial unions – in terms of playing identity, selection policy and individual player needs – would, I think, greatly benefit, not just the teams in Super Rugby and the NPC, but all levels of the game in New Zealand. But this requires rugby administrators of genuine vision and ability, making the search for the new NZR CEO all the more urgent and important.

With all the talk of young first fives, it’s good to keep an eye on some of the talent running around in the NPC. One of these talented young 10s is Harry Godfrey. Godfrey, like so many of his peers in NZ, is a hybrid, a player who shifts between 10 and 15. It looks like Godfrey might want to focus on being a first five. But if he’s going to do that, he’ll have to remember that the protocols for first fives and fullbacks are different. Whereas fullbacks like to attack and break the line, the first five’s first priority is to play the ball into space, through (1) the pass, (2) kick, or (3) carry. As a general rule, the 10 should want the ball often in his hands but for as short as possible a time, using his positioning and depth instead as a way to manipulate the defenders in front of him. A good example of Godfrey’s fullback-instincts were on display in this game against Counties Manukau, early in the second half. From the 2nd half restart, Godfrey does well to create a contestable, with Hawke’s Bay able to retain possession. From there, the Magpies go through the phases, a line break eventually coming from a post-contact Kienan Higgins offload to Grigg. With Hawke’s Bay on attack inside the Counties’ 22, this is an excellent opportunity for a strike. From a midfield ruck and with the Counties defence condensed, Godfrey calls for the ball out the back, the Magpies having a 3-on-2 out wide, with Zarn Sullivan looping around Godfrey and Devan Flanders holding the width on the edge. Godfrey receives the ball, with Sullivan and Flanders to his left Realizing there’s an overlap, the Counties’ final defender in the line, Josh Gray (14), rushes Godfrey to pressure his pass. While Godfrey does well to fake the pass and step, he doesn’t then pass to an unmarked Sullivan (who has a 2-on-1) but rather crabs back inside, until he’s eventually tackled close to the 22 metre-line. After side-stepping Gray, Godfrey needed to still find a way to connect with Sullivan, as the try is still on While Hawke’s Bay eventually recover and score a few phases later, this was still a win for the Counties defence, the available space not efficiently exploited by Godfrey, the latter forced back inside by the defensive shooter. And this is where the main lesson for Godfrey, as a first five, lies. Opportunities become more and more sparse as you go up the levels. At Super, the defence could’ve held for longer after the failed execution, with the risk of an attacking mistake increasing. At Test level, defenders are so switched on that, when Godfrey starts crabbing, you’d have hunters immediately over the ball looking for the turnover. And then, you’d have gone from a scoring opportunity to a defensive lineout around the halfway line. If Godfrey, in other words, wants to make a case as a first 5/8 for the Hurricanes (and beyond), he’ll have to showcase real attacking efficiency at NPC-level. Otherwise, he might have to settle for an extended stint at fullback, where his tendencies to hold the ball in search of the line break are likely to be more welcomed and encouraged.

With Rugby Australia deciding to scrap the Giteau Law, I wanted to take a quick look at what can reasonably be expected to happen to the Australian SRP teams. There’s a pretty obvious precedent, South Africa scrapping their own restrictions on overseas selection in 2018 with the appointment of Rassie Erasmus. Of course, there are some considerable differences between the two cases: the different status of rugby in South Africa and Australia, the South African shift in competitions and hemispheres in 2020, the economic collapse of the rugby market after Covid, you can go on for a while. I’m going to ignore all of this (for now), and just focus on what concretely happened in terms of player movement in South African rugby after 2018 and what this potentially means for Australian rugby in 2025 and beyond. Returning to 2018 This is how the different South African franchises looked in the 2018 SR season, as far as Springboks-per-team was concerned. It’s remarkable how evenly spread the distribution of Springboks was, at the time, each team having between 11 and 15 Boks available to them. Of course, there was still a considerable degree of difference in terms of quality and experience – Jamba Ulengo (1 cap) at the Bulls against someone like Frans Malherbe at the Stormers – but still, a considerable depth of talent and pedigree in each team. So how did Rassie’s opening of the market impact this Springbok-presence at the South African franchises? Before we can look at the player transfers for the 2019 season, we need to look at how the market was before these restrictions were lifted. For the 2017-18 season, 22 players had left their South African teams for an overseas club. Of those 22 players, 10 had played for the Springboks, including some relatively high-profile names such as Jan Serfontein (Bulls to Montpellier) and Pat Lambie (Sharks to Racing 92). But both Serfontein and Lambie remained eligible for the Boks due to the 30-cap rule. Fringe Boks, however, like Faf de Klerk (Lions to Sale Sharks, 11 caps) and Cobus Reinach (Sharks to Northampton Saints, 10 caps) made themselves willingly ineligible, at the time, by moving overseas. So, despite the restrictions, there was still plenty of movement among players for overseas contracts, including fringe Boks. With SA Rugby’s decision to scrap the limitations on overseas selection, players like de Klerk and Reinach became eligible again from 2018 onwards. So what happened in the first summer after these limitations were done away with? In this first summer of the open market, the numbers remained remarkably consistent, with 20 players moving from South Africa to overseas teams, only 6 Boks leaving the Republic. Furthermore, most of these leaving Boks weren’t particularly high profile ones: Ruan Dreyer (Lions to Gloucester), Jaco Kriel (Lions to Gloucester), Rohan Janse van Rensburg (Lions to Sale Sharks), Nizaam Carr (Stormers to Wasps), and Raymond Rhule (Stormers to Grenoble). Only one – Franco Mostert to Gloucester – would be considered a crucial part of the Springboks, and his departure was largely influenced by Johan Ackermann going to Gloucester and taking a raft of Lions players with him. This perhaps shouldn’t come as a surprise, since the changes to the eligibility-criteria were announced in May of 2018, when most players will have already signed their contract for next season. This should then be seen as a continuation of the market-profile of the 30-cap era, where some Boks decide to go overseas, as well as many fringe club players, looking for opportunities abroad. The floodgates open It was only in the next season that the new reality would hit, and boy, would it hit hard. For the 2019-2020 season, no less than 47 (!) players would leave South African shores for an overseas team. Of those 47, no less than 20 would be Springboks. (Sidenote: looking back, I think this mass exodus largely impacted Mark Robinson’s thinking in not particularly trying to retain the South African teams in Super Rugby. A short-sighted decision, perhaps.) And these were not just any Boks, these were crucial players to the 2019 World Cup win: Lood de Jager (Sale Sharks), RG Snyman (Honda Heat), Duane Vermeulen (Kubota Spears), Handré Pollard (Montpellier), Jesse Kriel (Canon Eagles). And that’s just from the Bulls. Marx (NTT Shining Arcs), Etzebeth (Toulon), de Allende (Panasonic Wild Knights), they would all leave for more profitable overseas deals. So the Australians can expect, not this summer, but the next one to be absolutely brutal, with European and Japanese teams strongly targeting top Australian talent, as well as this talent willing to grab better deals. At the same time, players at the fringes of national selection also started to look for overseas deals, as they were no longer tied to the Springbok 30-cap rule. Talented players who created depth in the South African teams like Hanro Liebenberg (Leicester Tigers) and Jacques Vermeulen (Exeter Chiefs) also went to overseas teams, where they would form the backbone of Premiership contenders, instead of staying in South Africa, hoping for a Bok call-up. 2020-21: a slowing market Thankfully perhaps, the player trajectory and the market would once again start to shift in the next season, meaning that there wasn’t an endless drain of talent. Instead, if we look at the player movements of the next few seasons, both the numbers of Boks and non-Boks going overseas would not reach the levels of 2019-20 again, returning rather to the levels of before 2018 (around 15 to 25 players leaving annually). A large part of this has to do, of course, with the Covid-pandemic which ruined teams’ finances, with the effects of this market collapse still being felt today. A similar thing will, hopefully, not happen for the Australian case. But there were other factors which impacted this trend as well, which could also apply to Australian rugby. One of these factors was the reality of having active internationals on the club’s books. As overseas teams became more and more aware that these Springboks would be away for a long time during the year – July and November Internationals, the Rugby Championship – their demand drastically dropped in the next few seasons. French teams especially, who have high requirements of their players in the nearly year-long Top 14, lost much of their appetite for high-profile South African players, as they would be gone for a long time as well as not perform (e.g. Etzebeth at Toulon and Kolisi at Racing 92) in the same way for their clubs as they did for the Springboks. Another factor was private investment in South African rugby at home as well. With SA Rugby more open to the mechanisms of the open market, there also appeared more opportunities for private investment in South Africa itself, with rich benefactors and wealthy investment groups becoming large stakeholders at both the Bulls (Johann Rupert and Patrice Motsepe) and the Sharks (MVM Holdings). Players like Etzebeth, Kolisi, Esterhuizen and le Roux were brought back to the Republic, where their playing time was more carefully monitored and expectations weren’t quite as rigorous as they were overseas. Interestingly then, the opening of the market didn’t necessarily lead to the mass exodus of Springboks as first feared. To the contrary, as the below table shows, there are actually more Springboks playing for South African teams in 2025 (59 players) than there were in 2018 (55 players). Part of this is, of course, Rassie Erasmus’ policy of spreading his caps, which means that a lot more players get capped these days than before. But it also shows that (1) the overseas market doesn’t have a massive and endless appetite for internationally active players (emphasis on active), and (2) private investment can combat overseas market forces. As a sidenote, comparing 2018 to 2025, it is interesting to see how the equal distribution of Springboks has vanished. Instead, we see the brutal mechanics of the open market at play, with a team like the Lions, with no private investment, lagging far behind the other teams, being instead forced to heavily invest in youth while typically losing their best players to either overseas teams or other South African franchises. Lessons for Rugby Australia So there are a few massively important lessons for the Wallabies and Rugby Australia here, I think. First of all, if the limitations on eligibility are scrapped, it is imperative that the Wallabies actually select from overseas. You have to show overseas clubs that you are going to use these players and you will enforce World Rugby regulations in order to do so. This has the effect of devaluing top Australian players, which will make sure that not all international-quality players are actually playing overseas. If, however, these scrapped criteria are just talk, then you’ll get the worst of both worlds: there will be no downside whatsoever to buying top Australian talent, which will mean that the Super Rugby Pacific-competition will haemorrhage both established Test stars as well as fringe talent, with no immediate way of getting either a good Test team or a talent-rich local competition. You have to have, paradoxically, a considerable cohort of overseas players in the Wallabies for your local competition to survive. And secondly, private investment must be allowed and even encouraged. By doing this, you open up another avenue through which Australian players can eventually return home, should they wish, while making the local SR-teams more financially robust as well. There are plenty of rich benefactors in Australia who love their union; RA should tap into that resource as much as possible in order to make their own market positioning competitive. South African Rugby has shown that opening up your selection policies can work but this also means that you open yourself up to the cold mechanisms of open market capitalism. There is no point in scrapping the eligibility-criteria and then just lightly dabbling your feet in the water. Rugby Australia have made their decision; now it is time to take the deep plunge.

I’ve seen some questions around the precise value of Josh Lord and what he brings to the All Blacks so I thought it would be interesting to briefly take a closer look at his profile as a rugby player. Saturday’s Bulls’ game against the Taniwha provides, I think, a nice summation of Josh Lord’s style of play and how he’s able to impact the contest on the pitch. Four aspects – lineout ability, general skillset, defence, and rugby intelligence – stand out to me, with Lord shaping essentially as a tight five glue player at Test level, someone who shows good understanding of the flow and rules of the game, which he uses to put pressure on the set piece and skillset of the opposition. Lineout ability The first aspect, lineout ability, speaks rather for itself. Lord has long arms and a good jump, so even when the timing of the lift and height of the throw is somewhat off (not an unlikely scenario with some of the hookers around), Lord is often still able to grab the ball. If the French series has shown anything, it’s the importance of genuinely tall units who can provide lineout ball as well as get up high in the air for contestable restarts. General skillset A typical facet of the current AB game plan is ball movement, the ball being kept alive through the phases in a quick and swift manner. In this regard, the tall lock has shown smooth hands throughout his career, being both comfortable as a backdoor passer as well as willing to serve as makeshift 9 in order to keep the play moving. Lord trusts his handling and passing skills, quickly moving into the halfback position with Lennox caught up in the ruck. Furthermore, Lord is comfortable with the ball in his hands in space, showing good technique in the 47th minute by holding the ball in his two hands, using multiple pass fakes in order to manipulate opposition defenders. Defensive ability The Taranaki lock is massive (2.03m) but remarkably agile for his frame. He moves well around the field and is versatile in the tackle, being both able to chop carriers around their ankles as well as wrap ball and man in upper-body hits with a strong shoulder. In the 24th minute, for example, Lord engages in a double tackle, with O’Neill going low and Lord going high on Alaimalo, the lock targeting the carrying arm with force and forcing the spill. Forcing the knock-on: Lord targets Alaimalo’s carrying arm, creating the turnover A few minutes later, Lord goes low in the tackle on Caird, with Lennox and Poliko this time targeting the upper-body. Lord going very low on Caird, stopping him in his tracks Added to this tackle versatility is the ability to scan the opposition attack, anticipating overlaps and working hard to plug gaps in defence. Right after making the chop tackle on Caird, Lord spots that the Taniwha have numbers on the left and immediately starts sprinting towards the opposite side. Lord gets up from the tackle, scans the Northland attack and starts sprinting to the other side of the field The sequence in full, which is Josh Lord in a nutshell: equal parts vision and mongrel. Keep your eyes on Lord in back play Here, we see the combination of Lord’s work rate and shithousery: after going full throttle in order to help stop the Northland line break, he first bumps Pasitoa out of the play without the ball (that’s a clear penalty and probable yellow card) before assisting Tikoisolomone with the tackle on Trainor. While he gets away with it here, Lord clearly pushes the boundaries. Then again, the anticipation of the opposition line break shows a remarkable rugby brain in action. Rugby intelligence Throughout the game, Lord showed signs of being quick on his feet, literally and figuratively. Another, more legal instance was in his understanding of the offside line, for example, by quickly moving into the Taniwha attacking line when the ref called the ball out of the ruck. Lord (5, in the front) moves as soon as the ref indicates that the ball is out. Someone like Eben Etzebeth has shown the importance of knowing the nuances of the offside line and breakdown rules to be effective as a Test lock Another example occurred during a Northland lineout: with the Taniwha throwing to the front, Lord reacts immediately to the ball being shifted to the 9 (and the lineout being effectively over), making him able to pressure Nock’s transfer to the backline. Quick as a flash: Lord nearly catches Nock by being aware of the lineout rules on offside Summary Josh Lord doesn’t offer the work rate of a Barrett or Holland, the attacking instincts and footwork of a Vaa’i or the carrying power of a Patrick Tuipulotu. But what he does offer in spades is rugby intelligence and mongrel, as well as the traditional set piece abilities of a 2m+ lock. But while he has, I think, qualities which should really shine in Test rugby, his inability to simply stay on the field makes it doubtful whether we will ever see him for a long period in the black jersey. In this sense, Saturday’s match against the Taniwha was perhaps the most indicative yet, Lord watching from the side lines after getting a knock, his body not quite able to produce what his rugby brain wants it to.